Continuous time dynamics of the Thermal Minority Game by Garrahan, Juan P. et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
00
42
77
v2
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  1
1 J
ul 
20
00
Continuous time dynamics of the Thermal Minority Game
Juan P. Garrahana, Esteban Morob and David Sherringtonc
Theoretical Physics, University of Oxford, 1 Keble Road, Oxford OX1 3NP, United Kingdom
(April 17, 2000)
We study the continuous time dynamics of the Thermal Minority Game. We find that the
dynamical equations of the model reduce to a set of stochastic differential equations for an interacting
disordered system with non-trivial random diffusion. This is the simplest microscopic description
which accounts for all the features of the system. Within this framework, we study the phase
structure of the model and find that its macroscopic properties strongly depend on the initial
conditions.
Many of the current challenges for statistical physics
have their origins in problems in biology [1] and eco-
nomics [2,3]. In particular, the application of ideas and
techniques of the statistical mechanics of disordered sys-
tems can prove useful in the study of systems of adaptive
and competitive agents, which are relevant, for example,
to the microscopic modeling of financial markets; and,
conversely, such problems can raise new issues for statis-
tical physics. One of these systems is the minority game
(MG) [4,5], a simple model based on Arthur’s “El Farol”
bar problem [6] which describes the behaviour of a group
of competing heterogeneous agents subject to the eco-
nomic law of supply and demand. Despite its simplicity,
the MG is very non-trivial, and although much progress
has been made in the qualitative [7–9] and quantitative
[10,11] understanding of its features, a full analytic solu-
tion of the MG is still missing.
The main hurdles in the way of an analytical study of
the MG in its original formulation were its non-locality in
time due to the dependence on the game history, its dis-
crete kinematics and dynamics, and the “best-strategy”
rule (see, however, [10]). The first of these obstacles was
overcome in [12], where it was shown numerically that the
macroscopic behaviour of the MG was unchanged if the
real history was replaced by a random one. This allowed
the study of a simpler stochastic Markovian problem in-
stead of the original deterministic non-Markovian one.
In [13] a natural continuous generalization of the MG
was presented. The “information” to which the agents re-
acted was taken as an external input to the system and
it was shown that all the macroscopic features of the MG
were preserved, as long as the external information was
ergodic in time, the simplest choice being just noise. To
handle the problem of the ‘best-strategy’ rule, the Ther-
mal Minority Game (TMG) was introduced, in which a
certain degree of stochasticity in the choice of the strate-
gies by the agents was allowed, controlled by a parameter
T , the “temperature”, the limits T = 0 and T =∞ cor-
responding to the original deterministic MG and the case
of completely random strategy choices, respectively. The
TMG displayed extra non-trivial structure as a function
of T , notably that in the region where the MG performs
worse than random, the system can be made to perform
better than random by allowing a certain degree of indi-
vidual stochastic error.
In the present paper we carefully study the continu-
ous time limit of the TMG, in order to obtain the sim-
plest microscopic description which accounts for all the
macroscopic features of the system, and as a further step
towards an analytical solution of the model. We confirm
that the external information ‘integrates-out’ providing
simply an effective coupling between agents. We also
show the crucial dependence of the macroscopic prop-
erties of the model on the initial conditions. We find
that the microscopic equations of the TMG reduce to a
set of disordered stochastic differential equations with a
non-trivial random diffusion matrix, and study the phase
structure of the model in the temperature/dimension
plane.
The setup of the TMG is as follows [13]. The system
consists of N agents playing the game. At each time
step t, each agent reacts to a common piece of “infor-
mation” ~I(t), by making a “bid” bi(t) (i = 1, . . . , N).
The information, defined as a unit-length vector in RD,
is taken to be a random noise, δ-correlated in time and
uniformly distributed on the unit sphere [14]. The bid
b(t) is defined to be a real number, which can be in-
terpreted as placing an order in a market, of size |b(t)|
and positive/negative meaning buy/sell. Bids are pre-
scribed by “strategies”: maps from information to bid,
R
D → R. For simplicity the strategy space Γ of the
model is restricted to the subspace of homogeneous lin-
ear mappings. A strategy ~R is defined as a vector in RD,
subject to the constraint ‖ ~R‖ = √D, and the prescribed
bid is just the scalar product ~R · ~I(t). Each agent has
S strategies, drawn randomly and independently from Γ
(with uniform distribution) remaining fixed throughout
the game. In what follows we will restrict for simplicity
to the case of two strategies per agent S = 2, the gener-
alization to S > 2 being straightforward. At time step
t each agent i chooses one of his/her strategies ~R⋆i (t)
to play with. The “total bid” (or “excess demand”) is
then A(t) ≡ ∑j bj(t) = ∑j ~R⋆j (t) · ~I(t). The agents
keep track of the potential success of the strategies by
assigning points to them, which are updated according
to P (~R, t + 1) = P (~R, t) − A(t) b(~R)/N , where P (~R, t)
represents the points of strategy ~R at time t.
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In the original formulation of the MG the agents played
in a deterministic fashion using their ‘best’ strategies,
the ones with the highest number of points. In the
TMG the natural generalization to non-deterministic be-
haviour is allowed. At time step t, each agent i chooses
~R∗i (t) randomly from his/her { ~R1i , ~R2i } with probabil-
ities {π1i (t), π2i (t)}. The probabilities πai (t) are func-
tions of the points parameterized by a temperature T ,
defined so as to interpolate between the MG case at
T = 0, all the way up to the totally random case
π1i = π
2
i = 1/2 at T = ∞. The qualitative behaviour
of the system does not depend on the specific functional
form of the πai (t). In [13] the probabilities were defined
as π1,2i (t) ∝ exp [βP (~R1,2i , t)] (with π1i (t)+π2i (t) = 1 and
β = 1/T ), while an alternative convenient form is given
by π1,2i (t) ∝ exp [±βzi(t)], where zi(t) ≡ sgn(pi(t)), with
pi(t) ≡ [P (~R1i , t) − P (~R2i , t)]/2. The consequential dif-
ference between these two definitions will be discussed
below.
The set of unconstrained degrees of freedom of the
TMG is given by the difference pi(t) of the points of
the two strategies of each agent. The choice of strategies
can then be defined by ~R∗i (t) =
~hi + ~ξi sgn [si(t) + µ(t)],
where si(t) ≡ π1i (t) − π2i (t), ~ωi ≡
(
R1i +R
2
i
)
/2, ~ξi ≡(
R1i −R2i
)
/2, and µ(t) is a stochastic random variable
uniformly distributed between −1 and 1 and indepen-
dently distributed in time. The equations for the point
differences then read,
pi(t+ 1) = pi(t)− ~a(t) · ~I(t) ~ξi · ~I(t), (1)
where ~a(t) ≡ ∑i ~R⋆i (t)/N . Eqs. (1), together with the
random processes for ~I(t) and R∗i (t), define the dynam-
ics of the TMG.
The average of the total bid A(t) over time and
quenched disorder is zero, so the first relevant macro-
scopic observable of the TMG is its normalized stan-
dard deviation σ (or “volatility”) σ2 ≡ N−1〈A2(t)〉,
where the overline means disorder average, and 〈·〉 ≡
limt→∞
1
t
∫ t0+t
t0
(·) dt′. In [13] it was found that σ had
a non-trivial structure both as a function of the re-
duced dimension of the strategy space d = D/N and
of the temperature. The second important observable
is the fraction φ of “frozen” agents, defined as those
for which one of the strategies always outperforms the
other, φ ≡ N−1∑i δ (|〈zi(t)〉| − 1), with the normaliza-
tion δ(0) = 1. It was introduced in [10] as an order
parameter for the MG, where it was found that φ(d)
changed from zero to a finite value at d = dc.
We now consider the continuous time limit of Eqs. (1)
in such a way as to preserve all the macroscopic features
of the TMG. To this end we introduce an arbitrary time
step ∆t. We deal first with the information ~I(t). Let
us assume that ~I(t) is a differential random motion in
the space of strategies, i.e., ~I(t) = ∆ ~W (t), with zero
mean and variance ∆t. Replacing in Eqs. (1) we obtain
pi(t+∆t) = pi(t)−~a(t) ·∆ ~W (t) ~ξi ·∆ ~W (t). In the limit
∆t → 0, and using the Kramers-Moyal expansion [15],
we get
dpi(t) = −~a(t) · ~ξi dt/D +O(dt2). (2)
Note that to O(dt) the noise has been eliminated in
favour of an effective interaction among the agents, and
the σ becomes σ2 = (ND)−1〈~a(t) · ~a(t)〉.
At T = 0, corresponding to the MG, Eqs. (2) are com-
pletely deterministic. To first order in dt we have
dpi(t) = −[hi +
∑
j
Jij zj(t)] dt, (3)
where hi ≡
∑
j ~ωj · ~ξi/ND and Jij ≡ ~ξj · ~ξi/ND, while
the volatility reads
σ2 = Ω + 2
∑
i
hi 〈zi(t)〉+
∑
ij
Jij 〈zi(t) zj(t)〉, (4)
and Ω ≡∑ij ~ωi · ~ωj/ND. In order to check the continu-
ous time approximation at T = 0 we have simulated Eqs.
(3). Results are presented in Fig. 1. We can see that this
approximation reproduces all the features of the original
MG. Note that in Eqs. (3) all stochasticity coming from
the information has dropped out, the only effect being a
small quantitative deviation in the low d region.
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FIG. 1. Volatility σ as a function of the reduced dimen-
sion d = D/N . Squares  correspond to the original dynam-
ics Eqs. (1); circles © to simulations of Eqs. (3), where an
Euler algorithm has been used with time step dt = 0.05; dia-
monds ✸ to the approximation of [11]. In the inset we show
φ as a function of d. Average over 100 samples; N = 100;
t = t0 = 10
4.
Eqs. (3) can be rewritten as dp/dt = −∇sH, where
p ≡ (p1, . . . , pN ), similarly for s, and
H = 1
2
Ω +
∑
i
hisi +
1
2
∑
ij
Jijsisj . (5)
This is similar to what was done in [11] for the time and
information averages of zi. There the value of σ was
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related to the average extrema of H by assuming that
the system equilibrated. A good agreement with the nu-
merics was found in the phase d > dc, but this method
failed to reproduce the behaviour in the d < dc phase
(see Fig. 1). This disagreement was speculated as due
to the need for terms with higher order time derivatives
in the continuous time equations. This is clearly wrong,
since, as we have just shown, Eqs. (3) describe correctly
the dynamics of the model for all values of d (see Fig. 1).
The phase d < dc of the MG is very sensitive to the ini-
tial conditions. In Fig. 2 we show the results of simulating
both the original dynamics Eqs. (1) and the continuous
time approximation Eqs. (3) starting from random ini-
tial conditions |pi(0)| = O(1). From Fig. 2 see that the
behaviour of both σ and φ is different from that of Fig. 1
in the region d < dc: the system stays in the better-than-
random phase for all values of d. Again the continuous
time dynamics is very close to the original discrete one.
This sensitivity of the results to the initial conditions is
a clear indication that the system does not equilibrate
for d < dc, and raises a question on the existence and
character of the “phase transition” in the MG [10].
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FIG. 2. Volatility as a function of d for random initial
conditions |pi(0)| = O(1), for the original dynamics Eqs. (1)
and the continuous time approximation Eqs. (3). Dotted lines
correspond to zero initial conditions and the approximation
of [11]. In the inset we show the fraction of frozen agents
φ. Symbols and details of the simulations are those of the
previous figure.
When the temperature is different from zero the TMG
Eqs. (2) still depend on the stochastic choice of strate-
gies R∗i (t), even at leading order. At each time step,
R∗i takes one of the two possible values R
1,2
i , defining
a stochastic jump process. In order to write the corre-
sponding Master Equation we need to know the tran-
sition probabilities. The r.h.s. of Eq. (2), which we
denote ∆i, is a normalized sum of N random numbers
~ξi · R∗j (t), each with mean ~ξi · ~ωj + ~ξi · ~ξj sj(t), and vari-
ance (~ξi · ~ξj)2[1 − s2j(t)]. By the central limit theorem,
we know that for N large ∆i will tend to be normally
distributed with mean 〈〈∆i〉〉 = ∂H/∂si, and variance
〈〈∆2i 〉〉 =
∑
j J
2
ij [1 − s2j (t)], where 〈〈·〉〉 stands for average
over realizations of the random process µ(t). Moreover,
∆i and ∆j 6=i are correlated, the covariance matrix given
by
Mij [p(t)] ≡ 〈〈∆i∆j〉〉 − 〈〈∆i〉〉〈〈∆j〉〉
=
∑
k
Jik Jjk
[
1− s2k(t)
]
. (6)
Collecting these results, we obtain the transition prob-
abilities in the large N limit, W (p′|p) = Φ(∇sH;M),
where Φ corresponds to the normal distribution with
mean ∇sH and covariance matrix M ≡ {Mij}. Note
that ∂H/∂si ∼ O(1), and Mij ∼ O(1/N), so that fluctu-
ations are also of O(1) and thus are not suppressed when
N →∞.
The R∗i (t) are chosen independently at each time. If
we make the natural assumption that in the limit dt→ 0
their correlation at different times is a δ-function, the
Master Equation becomes a Fokker-Planck equation by
means of Kramers-Moyal expansion [15]
∂P
∂t
= −
∑
i
∂
∂pi
(
∂H
∂si
P
)
+
1
2
∑
ij
∂2
∂pi∂pj
(Mij P) . (7)
We therefore conclude that the dynamics of the TMG
is effectively described by a set of stochastic differential
equations for the point differences
dp = −∇sH dt+M · dW, (8)
whereW(t) is anN -dimensional Wiener process, and the
volatility is given by σ2 = 2〈H〉+∑i Jii −∑i Jii〈s2i 〉.
We have checked by means of extensive numerical sim-
ulations that Eqs. (8) give the same results as Eqs. (2),
up to statistical errors. Figs. 3 and 4 present the results
from the continuous time dynamics Eqs. (8). For these
simulations we have chosen for the strategy-use proba-
bilities the form π1,2i (t) ∝ exp±βzi(t) which makes the
numerics simpler. Similar results can be obtained with
the form π1,2i (t) ∝ expβP (~R1,2i , t), but a small-p cutoff
of O(dt) is required to avoid the system getting trapped
in the p = 0 region. In Fig. 3 we plot the volatility as a
function of the temperature, showing that the behaviour
is the same as the one found in [13]: for d < dc, as T is
increased σ first drops to a minimum, and then increases
towards the random case σ = 1; for d > dc, the optimum
value is the MG one, and σ simply grows monotonically
to 1. In the inset we give σ as a function of d for different
temperatures.
Fig. 4 shows how the fraction of frozen agents varies
as the temperature is increased. For all values of d there
is a clear jump at T = O(1) from the MG value to φ = 1
[16]. Figs. 3 and 4 determine the phase diagram of the
TMG in the (d, T ) plane. It is schematically depicted in
the inset of Fig. 4. For low d and T the system performs
worse than random, while for large enough values of T
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the system becomes random, independently of d. Better
than random performance is achieved between these two
regions. It is important to note that, as in the case of the
MG, the phase structure of the TMG depends strongly on
the initial conditions. In particular, the low (d, T ) part
of the phase diagram shrinks to zero for finite random
initial conditions.
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FIG. 3. Volatility as a function of the temperature
from the continuous dynamics Eqs. (8). Inset: volatility
as a function of d for different values of the temperature
T = 10−3, 1, 2, 10 (•, ✷, , and △, respectively). A second
order stochastic Heun algorithm has been used with time step
dt = 0.02. Average over 20 realizations of the Wiener process
and 50 samples; N = 100; t = t0 = 10
4; initial conditions
p(t = 0) = 0.
In the case where the probabilities are defined as
π1,2i (t) ∝ expβP (~R1,2i , t), the monotonic increase of σ
to the random value at large T reported in [13] is due to
finite waiting times, as pointed out in [17]: for t ≫ NT
the volatility stays at the minimum value for any finite
T ≫ 1. This phenomenon is easily understood from Eqs.
(8). For large values of T , there is first a transient in
which si = tanhβpi are close to zero, and Eqs. (8) re-
duce to dpi ≈ −hi dt +
∑
jk JikJjkdWj , i.e., the point
differences of all the agents do a randomly biased Brow-
nian motion, and the system performs as in the random
case. Eventually, however, pi become of O(T ) and si fi-
nite, and the system effectively behaves as for T ∼ O(1).
Note that this cannot happen when si = tanhβzi.
Eqs. (8) are much simpler than the original ones for
the microscopic description of the TMG. The external
information has been replaced by an interaction among
the agents and the random strategy choice has given rise
to the diffusive term. They describe a dynamics which is
different from the relaxation of disordered systems usu-
ally found in physical problems: the random force ∇sH
can be written as the gradient of a potential function only
up to a factor, which amounts to a metric in the space of
p, and the non-trivial diffusion matrix M depends both
on the variables p and on the quenched disorder of the
problem. Finding adequate analytic asymptotic solutions
to this dynamics is the next challenging task.
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FIG. 4. Fraction of frozen agents φ as a function of T . In-
set: schematic phase diagram of the TMG in the (d, T ) plane.
Dashed lines indicate crossovers rather than sharp transitions.
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